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‘Conserere Sapientiam’, To Engage in Wisdom:
The Rhetoric of Philosophical Debate and
the Speech of Caecilius in Minucius Felix’s Octavius
Evan Dutmer
Abstract: Here I will elucidate both the rhetorical and philosophical significance of the
introduction to Minucius Felix’s Octavius—in effect, to give voice to what Minucius Felix
hoped to do in having Caecilius and Octavius conserere sapientiam (‘engage in wisdom’).
I draw special attention to the introduction to the dialogue because (i) Minucius’ rhetorical
care in establishing an appropriate otium (in other words, a locus amoenus) for his
dialogue participants has been underappreciated (ii) because Caecilius’ arguments have,
in general, been given short-shrift, and, (iii) because the view that the introductory parts
should, instead, be read with suspicion has found a recent prominent voice in an influential
recent article (Powell 2007).
Keywords: Minucius Felix, Octavius, Skepticism, Fideism, Dialogue, Debate
1. Introduction: ‘To Engage in Wisdom’: The Aim of the Octavius
Minucius Felix (fl. late 2nd century CE), by ancient accounts an accomplished lawyer
from Roman Africa, is known for one extraordinary work: a dialogue called the Octavius,
perhaps the oldest apologetic dialogue extant in Latin, and one of the few genuine glimpses
we have into direct, face-to-face pagan-Christian intellectual debate in Late Antiquity.
In it, two legal advocates on holiday, the pagan Caecilius and Christian Octavius aim
to conserere sapientiam. The very rare late Latin phrase means, literally, to ‘engage
in wisdom’, (perhaps more figuratively) ‘to battle in wits’, and, more specifically, and
according to most interpreters, to engage in philosophical dialogue. In fact, conserere
sapientiam is contrasted with ‘friendly’ debates among friends in Minucius’ dialogue (i.e., in
contubernalibus disputare): the former is a decidedly serious, challenging academic exercise.
In the Octavius, the Roman pagan skeptic Caecilius is desirous of just such a
serious intellectual debate (conserere sapientiam) between himself, on the one hand, and
Octavius, his Roman Christian counterpart, on the other, when he asks that the two have
a fair and comprehensive hearing on the matter of religion from both pagan and Christian
perspectives, so that he might repay Octavius for religious offense rendered earlier that day
when Octavius chuckled at Caecilius’ paying respects to a Serapis idol.1
1

For the (scant) ancient evidence for Minucius’ life, see Lactantius, Div. Inst. 6.1, and Jerome, De viris illus.
58, where he is said in both places to be a distinguished advocate. Eucherius mentions him at PL 50, 719. The
Octavius and Tertullian’s Apologeticum may have a common source, or one may draw from the other (the
question is open); both Minucius and Tertullian are from Roman Africa and of indigenous North African
origin. Cyprian and Minucius’ relationship and relative priority are similarly debated (see Cousins 1997 for a
helpful summary of the disputes). Powell 2007 is an excellent introduction to the textual details (including the
Renaissance rediscovery of the text) and summaries of the philological debates on the Octavius. For more on the
African identities of Minucius and Tertullian and the early African Church in general, see Rebillard 2012 and
Wilhite 2017. Minucius’, Octavius’s, and Caecilius’ Africanity has been associated with conjectural evidence in
the CIL— Minucius at 8.1964 and 12499; Octavius Januarius at Saldae, 8.8962; Caecilius at Cirta 8.7097-7098,
6996. Minucius Felix, in all likelihood, stands at the beginning of the Christian Latin controversial dialogue
tradition in antiquity, and the Octavius is the only direct Roman pagan-Christian dialogue in Latin extant.
For an excellent introduction to it (with a stellar bibliography), consult Kuper 2017. A full commentary has
appeared in German by Christoph Schubert in the last decade (Verlag Heder 2014). Hasenhütl 2008 functions as
a book-length commentary on Caecilius’ speech. For an introduction to the Greek and Syriac Christian dialogue
traditions, see Rigolio 2019. Recent studies of major later figures in the tradition (Augustine and Boethius) are
also helpful for navigating the personal, intellectual predicaments and conflicts faced by professional, ambitious
Roman Christians throughout Later Antiquity: for Augustine, see Stock 2010, 2011, Miles 2008; for Boethius,
see Moreschini 2014, Lerer 1985.
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In this essay I will discuss both the rhetorical and philosophical significance of
the introduction to Minucius Felix’s Octavius (both its setting and the first speech, that of
Caecilius)—in effect, to give voice to what Minucius Felix hoped to do in having Caecilius
and Octavius conserere sapientiam. I draw special attention to the opening sections of the
dialogue because I think that (i) Minucius’ rhetorical care in setting up an appropriate
otium (a locus amoenus) for his dialogue participants (in keeping with ancient dialogue
tradition) has been underappreciated (ii) because Caecilius’ arguments follow in a clear
philosophical skeptical lineage, and, (iii) last because the view that the introductory parts
should, instead, be read with suspicion has found a recent prominent voice in an influential
recent article. 2
Indeed, based on his own analysis of the rhetorical technique and philosophical
exposition in the Octavius, Jonathan Powell concludes that Minucius Felix, while feigning
philosophical impartiality for an intellectual debate between paganism and Christianity,
in fact only sets up Caecilius (and so, the reader) for a hasty and unwarranted conversion
to a sort of watered-down Christianity, himself failing to seriously consider an opposing
point of view. At its noblest, he thinks, the dialogue mimics Cicero’s own lost (but plausibly
reconstructed) Hortensius in abandoning the neo-Academic commitment to impartiality
by serving as unabashed Christian protreptic, as Cicero’s dialogue supposedly dropped the
veneer of principled skepticism for impassioned defense of philosophy. At its lowest, Powell
characterizes the Octavius as consisting in Christian “propaganda” (180).
Contrary to this view, I suggest that Minucius Felix in fact introduces a skeptical
position through Caecilius that, even if defective, is of a high philosophical pedigree and
well-respected in antiquity. Indeed, the resonances of Caecilius’ speech in the Octavius
with Cotta’s in Cicero’s De natura deorum are well-attested. Further, suggestive similarities
appear in fragments of the pagan polemicist Celsus’ True Doctrine (contained in Origen’s
Contra Celsum).3 Octavius’s arguments, then, are not pitched against some sort of
strawperson in Caecilius, but rather are well-suited to a particular line of typical ‘urbane’
skeptical line of argument, quite legible, I think, to Minucius Felix’s readership among the
Roman metropolitan elite.4 Robert Wilken identifies this line of argument as belonging
to ‘profoundly’ traditionalist thinkers in paganism’s twilight, calling Celsus himself a
‘conservative intellectual’. I think this an apt description of Caecilius as well.
Powell thinks that both the initial setting of the dialogue and the philosophical
content of the speech of Caecilius help to confirm his insidious reading of the Octavius. My
reading, on the other hand, will both (i) retrieve the skeptical-fideist philosophical center
of Caecilius’ speech and (ii) vindicate Minucius Felix’s presentation of that speech in its
rhetorical art—especially in its setting in the locus amoenus-topos.5 My view, then, of the
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Namely, J.G.F. Powell (2007) “Unfair to Caecilius? Ciceronian dialogue techniques in Minucius Felix,” in
Severan Culture, Simon Swain, Stephen Harrison, and Jas Elsner, Eds., Cambridge University Press. Powell’s
skepticism regarding the ‘genuineness’ of Minucius’ philosophical impartiality is anticipated by Anton Elter
in his Prolegomena zu Minucius Felix (Bonn 1909), where he argues that the Octavius appears to have the
elements more of a consolatio with an assumed Christian audience rather than a philosophical disputatio. For
a more positive appraisal, see Von Albrecht 1987, whose casting of Minucius Felix as a ‘Christian Humanist’
more closely resembles my line of interpretation.
For an exhaustive and at times side-by-side comparison of Minucius and Origen’s Contra Celsum, with an
excellent command of the nineteenth century scholarship on the Octavius, see Baylis 1928. For an excellent
summary of the arguments of Celsus himself, see Bergjan 2001.
This line of argument closely follows that of Cotta, one of the principal dialogue participants in Cicero’s De
natura deorum. For authoritative recent studies on Cotta and Cicero’s philosophy of religion as a whole, see
Wynne 2015 and 2019.
I say ‘skeptical-fideist philosophical center’ as I will principally concern myself with the overarching significance
and argumentative approach of Caecilius’ speech in this essay. I am particularly interested in the skepticalfideist bent of Caecilius’ speech that puts it in conversation with other skeptical fideist approaches to religious or
mystical belief in the history of philosophy. Certain specific claims and arguments against the Christians found
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Octavius as a genuine attempt at a Ciceronian-style philosophical dialogue, recognizable
as such to an ancient philosophical audience, is decidedly less dim.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the conclusion of the Octavius (i.e.,
Caecilius’ intellectual conversion to Christianity), I maintain that, like Augustine’s early
Cassiaciacum dialogues, they represent a genuinely philosophical attempt to overcome
pagan religion and attendant philosophical attitudes and modes of thinking (particularly
Academic Skepticism as filtered through Cicero) on intellectual grounds in a neutral
dialogue setting.
2. The Octavius: Pagan and Christian in Dialogue
The Octavius is a remarkable text. It is one of the very few late antique Latin works we
have that details intellectual debate between pagan and Christian in a familiar classical
literary setting. It may be the only Latin text that does so in Ciceronian dialogue form
(Augustine’s later dialogues do not include a practicing pagan representative).6 Nevertheless,
despite its deep situatedness in the intellectual culture of Roman late antiquity, the Octavius
is not a widely-read text in Classics. Consequently, I shall endeavor in this section to
provide a brief and clear overview of the dialogue for the purposes of this paper.
The dialogue begins in pensive, moody, heartfelt reflection of the narrator
(presumably Marcus Minucius Felix himself) on the friendship of the deceased Octavius.
The first words of the piece—cogitanti mihi (‘as I was thinking’)—are borrowed from
Cicero’s De oratore 1.1, initiating the Ciceronian allusiveness that permeates the beginning
of the dialogue. I shall say more about the touching, deep resonances with the themes of
friendship in Cicero’s De amicitia in a moment, though, as Powell notes, they have been
well-recognized.7 Minucius’ mind eventually fixes on a particular episode, a dialoguedebate between Octavius and Caecilius, which he recounts for us, where he played, in his
words, the role of arbiter between the two sparring friends.
The scene opens during the late summer holidays, after the solstice as autumn
has begun to cool the seaside landscape, on a retreat for the three lawyers (each of whom
hail from Roman North Africa—see my note 2). The location is Ostia, port of Rome, that
civitas amoenissima (2.3), where lavacra marina (‘sea-baths’) might soothe Minucius’
unbalanced humors. The three wake up one morning for a brisk walk by the sea, and
somewhere along their path the three come across an image (simulacrum) of Serapis. In
the manner of the superstitious (vulgus superstitiosus) Caecilius blows a kiss to the image.
Octavius rebukes him, saying that a friend ought not let a friend shipwreck on rocks in
broad daylight, even if such stones are prettified, anointed, or crowned (3.1), making
reference to Caecilius’ perceived idolatry.

6

7

in Caecilius’ speech will not be my subject here, though they would be important for a full philosophical
analysis of Caecilius’ speech. Many of these arguments have parallels with Celsus. Again see Bergjan 2001 for an
excellent introduction into a large literature.
Possible (extant or non-extant) Latin precedents to the Octavius (in dialogue form and pitched between Christian
and pagan) are debated. Vigorous debate in Latin and a rich African Roman Christian culture near Carthage
certainly flourished in Minucius’ lifetime, with Tertullian’s literary output nourished in similar fertile soils. (See
again Rebillard 2012, Wilhite 2017) But clear literary precedents are less clear. Non-Latin philosophical or
quasi-philosophical debates between Christian and pagan are intriguing possibilities, of which Minucius may
have been aware and in which Minucius hoped to be included. The Acta Archelai, preserved only in Latin,
contained a debate between Manes (of the Manichaean faith) and the Christian bishop Archelaus. Jerome
thought the Acta was originally written in Syriac. (De viris illus. 72) The Book of the Laws of the Countries
by a follower of Bardaisan, contemporary with Minucius, was written in Syriac, gesturing to the richness of
interreligious dialogue occurring in Mesopotamia and the Roman East. The reputation for cosmopolitan
learnedness (arrived at through philosophical debate) in Mesopotamia was well-attested in Late Antiquity and
is found in both Cassiodorus and Junillus Africanus. For some of these non-Latin points of contact, I thank an
anonymous reviewer for the New England Classical Journal.
See Powell 2007, 182.
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Caecilius stews but remains quiet; the three continue their walk to the seaside and
come upon a remarkable scene of quietude. The sea gently plays at their feet, prompting
a meditation on its curls; the shore curves gently as their stories about Octavius’ sea
adventures meander calmly; boats rest from long sea journeys above the sand, held up
on oaken planks. Last, in the most arresting image, a group of boys partake in a game of
skipping stones, prompting again a meditation on their game and the peace it brings to
the scene.
I shall have more to say on these striking, enduring images from the dialogue in a
moment. This stage-setting then brings about the abrupt outburst from Caecilius, who at
4.3, at Octavius’ asking why he has remained so quiet, requests a sort of quasi-hearing and
philosophical debate (a conserere sapientiam), hoping to both defend the traditional pagan
religion and cast doubt on the new Christian one. Caecilius chooses Minucius as arbiter,
even though Minucius himself is acknowledged as a convert—one who has experienced
both ways of life (diligenter in utroque vivendi genere, 5.1).
Caecilius’ speech treats several topics, but is rooted in a skeptical defense of the
ancestral pagan religion and a polemic against Christianity, the relative upstart. Caecilius
first doubts humankind’s ability to know the ultimate truth in matters divine (5.2-3), then
discourses on the nature of creation and of a unitary god, the multiplicity of religions and
the importance of ancestral, indigenous religions (6), the peculiar strength and usefulness
of the Roman religion (evidenced through the growth and success of the Roman empire)
(religionem tam vetustam, tam utilem, tam salubrem, 8.1), the secrecy and vices of the
Christian sects, in particular their libidinous religious practices (9.2)—for example, their
rumored adoration of the genitalia of the priest—the absurdity of the doctrine of the
resurrection, and so on. The charges range from inventive legitimate critique to typical
anti-Christian slander of the late antique period.
Octavius responds with an elegant apologetic speech, addressing Caecilius’ points
with learned assurance, showing facility in both Greco-Roman learning and Christian
apologetics. He especially hopes to make the new Christian religion compatible with the
best of secular learning and with the arts of rhetoric, logic, and philosophy, in this way
anticipating Augustine and, later, Cassiodorus. Early the speech focuses on the rational
defense of Christian creationism in the face of Caecilius’ skepticism. Octavius eventually
meets paganism’s supposed idolatry head-on with an enigmatic, staccato-style passage
describing the Christian god’s incorporeality (e.g., [deus] visu clarior est, 18.8). He then
defends monotheism with an appeal to the Greek philosophers, especially Plato. He meets
each charge of Caecilius one-by-one and refutes it, even claiming that Rome’s expansion
proved crime and terror, not divine providence (25).
When Octavius finishes, Caecilius and Octavius are silent, stupefied (ad silentium
stupefacti, 39.1). Eventually Caecilius admits that he has been won over on some of the
main points, and wants to call himself a Christian, though the details of the religion still
prompt questions from him. The dialogue ends with the three advocates in friendship and
good humor (laeti hilaresque) agreeing to discuss more the following day.
3. Powell’s Octavius: Captatio benevolentiae
Caecilius’ conversion by the end of the dialogue provides a good transition to introducing
Powell’s main criticisms of the Octavius.
First, he thinks the Ciceronian styling of the dialogue, both in setting and
composition betray ill intent on the part of Minucius Felix. They are literary deceits,
lacking the impartiality characteristic of a Ciceronian philosophical dialogue. He writes:
To a modern reader, indeed, the Octavius is prone to seem bland,
perhaps so bland as to cast doubt on either the convictions or the
capabilities of its author, but against a background in which Christians
15

had evidently been feared … and in which not much was generally
known or publicised about their doctrines, the blandness itself is
surprising and noteworthy, and invites interpretation as a deliberate
strategy rather than an unthinking effect of literary convention or a sign
of failure in conception (180).8
On Powell’s reading, the quiet and pleasant setting of Ostia by the ocean, the unhurried,
organic chatting and banter between the dialogue participants as they stroll on, the careful
Ciceronian style and diction employed by Minucius, all have a certain insidious lulling
effect, helping to lower the pagan reader’s defenses for Octavius’ eventual Christian
proselytization. Indeed, Powell emphasizes Minucius’ adeptness at creating the appearance
of pagan respectability, sophistication, and “urbanity” solely for the purposes of captatio
benevolentiae (179, 181).
Second, he thinks that the position that Caecilius is made to defend in the
Octavius—namely, that anything divine is uncertain but the traditional gods should
nevertheless be believed in and revered—is so inconsistent on its face that Octavius, in
his speech, is given a quick and total victory from the start. This, he says, is in contrast
to a traditional Ciceronian dialogue, where “the integrity of the interlocutors’ positions
is generally respected and conversion is a rare event,” and in which “the supreme values
are rational examination of all sides of a question and the reader’s freedom of judgement
to make up his or her own mind (182)”.9 For Powell, then, the resemblance between the
Octavius and a genuine Ciceronian dialogue is superficial. Again, he writes:
These literary techniques are also a way of giving an impression of
fairness and impartiality in philosophical debate which, when one
examines the actual positions attributed to the characters, turns out to be
quite unjustified. The impression we are meant to have is that Christian
Octavius has won in a fair contest; but in fact, although Caecilius the
pagan is given some reasonable individual points to make, it is clear
enough by the end that the dice have been loaded against him from the
start. (181)
I think Powell’s reading of the opening parts of the dialogue, if it is to convince us that
Minucius Felix is knowingly being deceptive in crafting his introduction, needs both of
these points to turn out to be right. But I think both fail to be convincing. We will take up
my criticisms and motivate my alternative reading in the next section.
4. A New Interpretation of the Introduction to Minucius Felix’s Octavius: The Rhetoric of
Philosophical Debate and Caecilius’ Urbane Skeptical Fideism
A. The Rhetoric of Philosophical Debate
In this section I will reproduce some relevant passages from the Latin text of the first
sections of the Octavius and, for each, give a short explication. In so doing I hope to argue
against Powell (and others who, in my view, unfairly doubt the intentions of Minucius
Felix in his commitment to free inquiry) by constructing plausible alternate readings of
both the initial set-up of the Octavius and the philosophical point Caecilius is trying to
make in his speech on behalf of the traditional Roman pagan point of view.
I will start, then, with the introduction of the dialogue. Minucius, the narrator,
recalls a conversation he had between his two friends, Caecilius, a pagan, and Octavius
8

9

Blandness, of course, figures prominently here. Beaujeu 1964 anticipates Powell in finding the staging of the
Octavius insidiously ‘bland’.
For an authoritative summary of the elements, aims, and Nachleben of the Ciceronian dialogue form, consult
Schofield 2008.
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(now deceased), a Christian, in which Octavius ‘remade’ (reformavit) Caecilius so that
he would accept ‘true religion’ (veram religionem), and he did so by serious argument
(disputatione gravissima) (1.5). Minucius begins his narration of the dialogue by telling
of the vacation the three took together to Ostia, where the discussion (and conversion)
took place. Minucius then takes pains to describe the setting by the sea, resulting in the
aforementioned stunning passage:
cum hoc sermone eius medium spatium civitatis emensi iam liberum
litus tenebamus. Ibi harenas extimas, velut sterneret ambulacro,
perfundens lenis unda tendebat: et, ut semper mare etiam positis flatibus
inquietum est, etsi non canis spumosisque fluctibus exibat ad terram,
tamen crispis tortuosisque ibidem erroribus delectati perquam sumus,
cum in ipso aequoris limine plantas tingueremus, quod vicissim nunc
adpulsum nostris pedibus adluderet fluctus, nunc relabens ac vestigia
retrahens in sese resorberet. (3.2-5)10
Passing through the middle of the city in conversation, we were now
coming upon the open beach. There was a gentle wave stretching over
the outlying sands, as it lay out like a promenade: and, as the sea is
always restless even with still waters, it was driving at the earth with
light waves, not white and crested sprays; nevertheless we were delighted
thoroughly by its curled, coiled wanderings, as we touched our feet at
the very limit of the water—as now the advancing wave played around
our feet, now it slips back and, retracing its steps, absorbs into itself.
I think Powell underestimates the literary quality of these opening passages when he lumps
them in with just so much “bland” stage-setting.11 More importantly, to miss the point of
these introductory passages risks Mincucius’ attempts to connect his dialogue with wellworn, legible rhetorical tropes meant to signal to his reader the aims and intent of this
disputatio gravissima.
Far from lulling the reader into some sort of daze, the colorful wordplay here
invites the reader to read on—in a state of relaxation, admittedly—moved as she might
be by the description of the gentle lapping of the waves on the seashore. The poetry and
rhythm of the above passage is apparent; the liquidity of the diction also plain to see.
Minucius, we might think, is not just describing a pretty sunset or the meandering chats of
a few friends without legitimate philosophical purpose: he is preparing us for philosophy—
i.e., the readers—via rhetoric for leisure that is conducive for intellectual activity and
refinement. In a word, for otium.12
I call this literary set-up the “rhetoric of philosophical debate” to emphasize its
role in providing the enabling conditions for philosophical-scholastic activity, but in so
doing I draw on a well-worn rhetorical topos literature. This setting is clearly within the
locus amoenus topos, given its classic formulation in Ernst Robert Curtius (1953/2013,
195). But rather than its being solely grounded in literary allusion or in persuasion for
persuasion’s sake, I hold that this rhetorical setting has philosophical grounds: namely, it
follows from a belief widely held in ancient philosophy regarding the interrelation between
otium and philosophia.
Indeed: the setting of the Octavius seems to be consistent with the ancient belief
10
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My translations throughout. The Latin text matches the Loeb Classical Library edition of 1931, with reference
to the standard critical edition (Kytzler 1981).
Indeed, in the words of an anonymous reviewer for the New England Classical Journal: “Minucius’ scenesetting, in my opinion, is one of the most striking of any Latin dialogue from any period.”
For the meditative aspects of ancient dialogue form, see Hadot 1995. See also Stock 2010, 2011.
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(shared nearly universally across Greek and Roman philosophical sects, and a good
number of religious traditions, besides) in the importance of relaxation and unbothered
attention in providing the material conditions for otium, namely, learned leisure aimed
at intellectual refinement and truth-seeking.13 Augustine later goes to similar lengths to
provide for leisurely conditions for the philosophical investigations of his Cassiciacum
dialogues (especially in the De beata vita) so that he might be able to effect for himself a
genuine Christianae vitae otium (Rectractions 1.1.1).14
The setting is no doubt alluring and picturesque (as is the further description
of the boys skipping stones at 1.6), but it would seem that we would need our minds
already made up to think that the careful stage-setting Minucius has chosen suggest he
merely means to bore or stupefy his reader. It rather seems the opposite is true, that the
introduction to the dialogue effects a kind of spiritual exercise to awaken and arouse the
mind of the reader through meditation, rendering it more plastic and fluid as it encounters
new philosophical ways of thinking and being in this world; and that deceptive, insidious
“blandness” (to make up for the explosive, counter-cultural truths of Christianity) would
seem far from Minucius’ plan.
And while Powell acknowledges that this opening setting adds to the
“respectability” of the Roman Christian participants by placing them in a “comfortable
social setting” (179) such as Ostia, I think he fails to appreciate how this passage fits in
with a long tradition of similarly dreamy settings (themselves sparkling examples of the
locus amoenus) in Platonic and Ciceronian philosophical dialogues (and which speaks
to Minucius’ genuine, good-faith appropriation of the Ciceronian dialogic genre to a
Christian subject matter).
To be sure, Platonic dialogues are often set in scenes of tranquillity and
repose, removed from the business and commotion of the city. The tense drama of
a Platonic dialogue—the exchange of ideas between participants in philosophical crossexamination—is often juxtaposed with a scene deliberately fashioned to be mundane
or ordinary, or secluded and set apart. The Republic starts off famously with its simple
“I went down to the Piraeus,” and depicts a house party during, but set apart from,
the commotion of the Panathenaea. The Symposium takes place during a hangover.
The Phaedrus outside the city walls near a stream. The Laws, of course, on a long trek,
only interrupted by occasional natural sights. Cicero too takes pains to set his dialogues
in secluded villas and during country walks, making room for leisure and philosophy.
Augustine’s later Cassiaciacum dialogues, similarly inspired by Ciceronian dialogic
conventions as Minucius Felix, take place in a country villa, far away from the business
and bustle of Imperial Milan. In short, given that the rhetorical precedent of a leisurely
setting for a philosophical dialogue already existed in the Platonic and Ciceronian dialogue
forms, and given that the description of Ostia is, as we have seen, carefully crafted and
appealing and has a plausible legitimate philosophical purpose (i.e., to prepare the mind
of the reader for philosophy), it appears a stretch for us to suspect that Minucius Felix is,
rather, being deliberately deceptive when he opens the Octavius in the idyllic surrounds
that he does. We may do so: but it risks being inadmissibly uncharitable.
In addition to its above purposes, I think the stage-setting of the Octavius serves
even deeper philosophical and formal ends in the dialogue’s plan. I bring attention in
particular to the remarkable use of water, naval, and marine imagery (including possible
13
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See Andre 1966, Sadlek 2004. For ancient Roman exempla, see Seneca’s De otio, Cicero, De officiis 3.1-4, and
Pro Sestio 45.98 for an influential formulation of the ideal of otium liberale: Id quod est praestantissimum,
maximeque optabile omnibus sanis et bonis et beatis, cum dignitate otium (that which stands first, and is most
to be desired by all healthy, good, and happy people, is leisure with dignity).
For a growing, fine literature on Augustine’s adaptation of classical dialogue techniques to his own intellectual
journey in his early works, see, to start, Foley 1999, 2019, Clark 2008, Kenyon 2018, Miles 2008. For this period
in his life, see Brown 2000, 2.11: “Christianae Vitae Otium: Cassiciacum,” for the classic treatment.
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allusions to ritual washing and healing), the description of the boys’ game of tossing
stones as a possible metaphor for the contest of philosophical debate itself, the theme of
retracing one’s steps, and the possibilities for a metatextual interpretation for the dialogue’s
introduction.15 Throughout the introductory stage-setting there is a repetition and rhythm
that are highly suggestive of careful and intentional literary craft; in Powell’s words,
they should catch the attention of the ‘alert reader’. I end my rhetorical analysis with a
suggestion that the introductory setting may serve a metatextual purpose—that conversion
for a pagan skeptic may take just such a ritualistic repetition, wanderings even (erroribus is
Minucius’ word), through both life and a text like the Octavius. In this way the Octavius
can remind us of Socrates in the Phaedo, where ritualistic ‘chants’ are needed for the
aspirant philosopher-in-training’s overcoming the fear of death.
I first begin with the purpose of the repeated uses of water, marine, and naval
imagery. In 2.3 Minucius introduces the healing properties of the sea (and especially the
famous sea-baths at Ostia). At 2.4 the sea breeze promises to reinvigorate and refresh each
of the participants. But then Octavius alludes to the great destructive power of the sea at
3.1 when he chides Caecilius’ veneration of the Serapis idol by comparing his doing so to a
shipwreck.
The sea returns as a restorative, renewing force in the next passage. We saw
above the delicate, rhythmic, supple prose Minucius employs to suggest water’s cool
receding and returning embrace. Octavius’ ‘adventures’ at sea are discussed as the three
enjoy the walk along the shore at 3.5. For Minucius and Octavius, the sea performs its
medicinal rites, cooling and calming their humors. For Caecilius, overwhelmed with
jealous anger at Octavius’ affront, the sea fails to bring calm and repose.
In 3.5 great ships await their next voyage, suspended in air on oak planks.
Octavius, too, and his companions find themselves ‘suspended’, just before the action of
the rest of the dialogue. The seaside setting proves to be the place not just for philosophical
debate, but another sort of ‘game’, the description of which immediately precedes the rest
of the dialogue.
In 3.5-6 we see young boys playing a game of stone skipping on the shore. I
reproduce the passage below to bring attention to its noteworthy features:
… pueros videmus certatim gestientes testarum in mare iaculationibus
ludere. Is lusus est testam teretem iactatione fluctuum levigatam
legere de litore, eam testam plano situ digitis comprehensam inclinem
ipsum atque humilem quantum potest super undas inrotare, ut illud
iaculum vel dorsum maris raderet vel enataret, dum leni impetu labitur,
vel summis fluctibus tonsis emicaret emergeret dum adsiduo saltu
sublevatur. Is se in pueris victorem ferebat, cuius testa et procurreret
longius et frequentius exsiliret. (3.6)
We saw some boys eagerly playing a game by tossing stones into the sea.
The game is to choose a stone from the shore, one smoothed down by
the tossing of the waves, grab hold of the flat side, then bow and stoop
low so that the stone spins as far as it can above the waves, so that the
little projectile either skims the surface of the sea and swims on, gliding
on gently by the impulse, or shaves the tops of the waves, leaping and
emerging as it is raised up in its regular skips and hops. The boy whose
stone went out longest and made the most jumps was proclaimed the
victor.
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I bring attention to this passage as it immediately precedes the main action of the dialogue,
the philosophical conversation between Octavius and Caecilius. In fact, Minucius notes
that they were wrapped in the joy (voluptate) of looking at this spectacle (spectaculi)
before Caecilius himself leaps into his first speech. Here the sea serves again as the neutral,
ambivalent setting for the two sides, bringing restorative and pleasant effects to Octavius
and Minucius, while allowing Caecilius to fester in his anger and offense (the seas of error
batter Caecilius again later in Octavius’ speech, 16.4).
But again, far from serving as only just so many merely literary fireworks, I think
Minucius’ placement of this meditation on the contest of skipping stones directly before
the succeeding philosophical exchange suggests a comment from Minucius on those very
episodes. The game of skipping stones, I think, is meant to serve as a metaphor for the
philosophical debate Caecilius himself requests. The ‘game’ of philosophy (if the metaphor
is to line up) consists in picking up an argument (in the metaphor, the testa), one smoothed
and refined by a philosophical or religious tradition (the successive waves—fluctibus), and
finding a victor once one’s speech or argument has gone on longest (longius) and made
the most flashy splashes (frequentius exsiliret). Caecilius wrongly suspects he has the most
refined and smoothed stones (supported by the traditions of the Roman religion and the
antiquity of Greek philosophy); Octavius shows him in the course of the dialogue that the
stones at the disposal of the new Christianity are in fact the most refined and smoothest of
all, themselves being more effective than the missiles of the philosophers (philosophorum
telis), while being easier (facilem) to use and more pleasant (favorabilem). (39.1)
Last, water features prominently in an enigmatic comment made by Octavius
amid his philosophical speech, where spirit and water find their place among the oldest
of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Octavius mentions Thales of Miletus, famous for his
priority among the philosophers and his view that water was the organizing principle of
the universe:
Sit Thales Milesius omnium primus, qui primus omnium de caelestibus
disputavit. Idem Milesius Thales rerum initium aquam dixit, deum
autem eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta formaverit (cp. Cic. Nat.
deor. 1.10.25). Eo altior et sublimior aquae et spiritus ratio, quam ut ab
homine potuerit inveniri, a deo traditum; vides philosophi principalis
nobiscum penitus opinonem consonare. (19.4-5)
Let us begin with Thales of Miletus, the first of all philosophers, who
was first to discuss heavenly matters. Thales said that water was the
beginning of everything, and that god was the mind that formed
everything from water. This is a theory of water and spirit too deep
and sublime to have been invented by a human being—it was passed
down by god; you see that the opinion of the first philosopher is fully
consonant with ours.
This theory (ratio) of water and spirit that Octavius mentions is, it would seem, a reference
to Genesis 1.2, when God’s ‘spirit’ or ‘wind’ hovers over the face of the primordial waters
of creation (“the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the deep, while
a wind from God swept over the face of the waters” Gen. 1.2 NRSV). This interpretation
of the opening to Genesis—where the waters represent a primary formless substance—is
a familiar one (see, e.g., Philo’s On Creation 11.38, Augustine’s Literal Commentary on
Genesis 4, also Tertullian’s Adversus Hermogenem; for Thales in a discussion of Genesis
in particular, see Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 2.14.2). Octavius expresses himself in an extremely
compressed way, but means to point out to us the importance of this consonance between
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Thales’ and Moses’ respective cosmogonies. Breath and water in both combine to create
order and understanding. Octavius’ and Caecilius’ seaside philosophical dispute may be
just that sort of creative, generative dialectical microcosm.
Retreading rhetorical flourishes from across the dialogue may seem overwrought.
Did Minucius intend for us to read the Octavius in this way? I think there are strongly
suggestive clues to such a hermeneutical approach in the stage-setting of the dialogue. As
mentioned above, treading, steps, retracing one’s steps, and making circles permeate the
beginning of the Octavius. I here show a few places that point to the importance of this for
the dialogue as a whole.
Again, retracing and retreading figure prominently in the start of the
philosophical exchange.16 At the very start, Minucius remarks on the memory of Octavius
(now deceased) and the incredible power it has on his mental faculties. Thinking about
him makes him seem to return to the past itself (in praeterita redire) rather than just to
remember him (revocare) long gone. Octavius, Caecilius, and Minucius’ seaside walk is
cast as inambulando (walking up and down). Minucius’ memorable description of the
curling and repeating waves at 3.3 includes the waters’ retracing steps and finding their
way back into themselves (nunc relabens ac vestigia retrahens in sese resorberet). Again,
the party goes back the way they came (viam rursus versis vestigiis terebamus). Caecilius’
speech notes the great difficulty of investigation of truth (itself an in-treading) (taedio
investigandae penitus veritatis). At the very conclusion of the dialogue (39-40), Minucius
sits silent (tacitus) after Octavius has finished speaking, turning over (evolvo) the speech
of Octavius in his mind, lost in admiration (magnitudine admirationis evanui) before
Caecilius interrupts him, prompting the explicit end to the dialogue.
These textual reminders point to the author’s hope that we too turn over the
arguments again and again. That, if we like, we too can bring Octavius before our mind’seye and re-turn to this investigation, weighing the arguments pro and con and make our
own judgment as to the strength of each, as Minucius himself is tasked to do by Caecilius.
Indeed, these images of tracing and retracing serve well the last aim of my
rhetorical analysis of the introductory setting of the dialogue. In particular, I think the
setting serves a metatextual purpose, where both memory of Octavius’ friendship and the
dialogue between Octavius and Caecilius on the seashore point to the cognitive difficulties
pagans in general (and pagans of a philosophical stripe in particular) may face in their
own ‘conversion story’. Crucial to overcoming these difficulties in Minucius’ view, I think,
is retracing, rethinking, repetition, and rereading.
Minucius, if we recall, is described by Caecilius as well-practiced in both pagan
and Christian ways of life (5.1). Importantly Octavius was not only his friend when on
the correct path, but also his dear friend in his wanderings (ipse socius in erroribus) (1.4).
Octavius gently brought him back to truth, treating him with love and patience while he,
Minucius, was in the depth of darkness (tenebrarum profundo). The gentle sea-foam curls
and wanders too at 3.2 (again, erroribus), but comes back into itself at regular intervals.
Octavius describes Caecilius as wandering (errantem), wavering constantly through error
(per errorem) at the beginning of his speech (16.1-2). He promises to argue for the truth
to finally free Caecilius from doubt and wandering (vagandum). Caecilius himself admits
that he has triumphed over this wandering and losing one’s way (ego triumphator erroris)
(40.1).
The intricate setting of the Octavius suggests both the trials and difficulties
awaiting the pagan convert to Christianity as well as the calming reassurance and
inevitability of the victory of an interlocutor like Octavius. Wanderings provide for both
16
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the necessary leisure and reinvigoration of the body and the senses, while they are also
limited to regular intervals, curled back into themselves like so many cresting waves.
The dialogue of the Octavius itself, I suggest, could be seen as one of those productive,
generative wanderings, a stone-skipping contest, that, if brought to mind once and again,
retraced and retreaded as if we are there, could assist the conversion experience of the
skeptically-minded unbelieving pagan.
Though this intellectual exercise (retracing and rehashing an argument) might
seem extra- or even sub-philosophical, I am reminded of Socrates’ mention of ritual
‘chants’ to face the fear of death in the Phaedo 77-78. There Socrates thinks that the
recollection argument has sufficiently shown the pre-existence of the soul, but now seeks to
employ new argumentation to dispel the fear that upon death the soul “blows away” and
“dissipates” (77e). Socrates characterizes this as a child’s fear, and Cebes responds:
“Try to convince us, Socrates,” he said, “as if we do have that fear. Or rather,
not as if we have the fear—maybe there’s a child actually inside us who’s afraid
of things like that. So try to convince that child to stop fearing death as if it were
the bogeyman.”
“Well,” said Socrates, “you must chant (epadein) spells to him every day until
you manage to chant it away.”
“Where then, Socrates,” he said, “will we find a good enchanter (epodos) for
such things, given that you,” he added, “are leaving us?”
“Greece is a large place, Cebes,” he said, “and there are no doubt good men in
it. There are also many races of foreigners. All of these people you must comb in
your search for such an enchanter, sparing neither money nor effort, as there’s
nothing on which you’d be better off spending your money” (77e-78a).
The Octavius, on my reading, is an attempt to capture just such an enchanter (epodos)
at the height of his powers, brought back as if to real life (in praeterita redire), a friend in
both times of affection (amoribus) and in wanderings (erroribus), who will not leave you
in the middle of your journey into truth (non respuit comitem), but, as you read, will in
fact lead you on your way (quod est gloriosius praecucurrit) (1.1, 4).
Still, we might think that those less trusting of Minucius Felix’s intentions in
his arrangement of this intricate locus amoenus and the metatextual function of both
the dialogue and character of Octavius are in fact generally skeptical of what I have
termed the preparatory rhetoric of philosophical debate. Rather than seeing these
literary features of a Ciceronian (or Platonic, for that matter) dialogue as conducive to
creating the conditions for the mental exercises that will be required of us upon entering
into a particular philosophical investigation, they may think that these detract from
the philosophical quality of the piece in question by interfering with the purity of the
argument.17 It is not my aim here to respond directly to this criticism. It is longstanding and
without an easy resolution. Some interpreters might indeed think this (i.e., that the dialogue
form may corrupt via rhetoric)—but if they do, I would point out, I do not think there is
special reason to think Minucius Felix uses the dialogue form to deceive or lull his readers
into a trap. One would have to think Plato, Cicero, and Augustine do roughly the same.
B. Caecilius’s Intellectual Position: Urbane Skeptical Fideism
But the first point of criticism from Powell I have addressed in this article,
namely, that Minucius Felix is being somehow deceptive in his opening to the Octavius—
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that his attempts at “blandness” and mere appearance of pagan respectability are meant
only to establish a dishonest intellectual trust between him and the reader—really only
succeeds if Minucius in fact has Caecilius defend an obviously absurd or weak position in
the course of the dialogue. Otherwise, our view of Minucius Felix’s rhetorical techniques in
the Octavius would likely be similar to our view of other thinkers’ using literary flourishes
in the Platonic dialogue tradition.
It is my view that Caecilius defends a position which is, indeed, difficult, but one
which is not ridiculous or obviously inconsistent; and, rather, one that is defensible from
a certain skeptical stance. In fact, I think it has a strong forerunners in Cicero’s Cotta in
the De natura deorum or, perhaps, the Celsus of the True Doctrine in Origen’s Contra
Celsum, and, more broadly, represents a certain cultural attitude among elite metropolitan
Romans common at the time of the Octavius’ composition.18 I call this philosophical
outlook “urbane skeptical fideism”.19
According to this view, since all is able to be doubted (including the truth of both
the ancestral pagan religions and the Christian upstart one), we ought to cleave to what
brings the most social benefit (i.e., the Roman pagan religion) provisionally, lest we risk
our individual reputation, safety, and the widespread social unrest that might arise with
wholesale societal conversion to a new religious mode of life.
I will now discuss this point by appealing, again, to the Latin of the Octavius.20
Caecilius’ speech in defense of traditional Roman pagan religion is the first
delivered in the course of the Octavius. In it, Caecilius defends two main theses. The first
is that in all things (but especially divine matters) there is no certainty (For this, Caecilius
relies on stock Academic Skeptic arguments regarding the unreliability of the senses.).21
The second is that, given that all is uncertain (including, of course, novel religious
movements), Romans ought to continue in practicing traditional pagan religion. He
supports this second claim with an appeal to the virtue and character of the Roman people
and their successes in war and empire. Throughout the speech other points are made, but
it is on these two theses that Caecilius’ position rests.
Caecilius represents an interesting mixture of two views: he is both skeptic and
traditionalist. These may at first seem to be in tension, but can be synthesized into a view
that, even if unattractive to some, is consistent. This view, as mentioned above, I call
“urbane skeptical fideism.”
I will consider the first thesis now. Caecilius says:
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nullum negotium est patefacere, omnia in rebus humanis dubia, incerta,
suspensa magisque omnia verisimilia quam vera. (5.2)22
it is no trouble to make clear, that all things are doubtful in human
affairs, and moreover that all things are suspended as probable rather
than true
He goes on to suggest that the Christians err in proclaiming knowledge about divine things
and exhorts knowledge of the self and political affairs:
et beati satis satisque prudentes iure videamur, si secundum illud vetus
sapientis oraculum nosmet ipsos familiarius noverimus (5.5).
And, if what that old oracle of the wise man says is true—that we know
ourselves more intimately—then it’s enough to be happy and wise [to
focus on knowledge of ourselves].
After Caecilius spends time considering the vicissitudes and unpredictability of the universe
and the incomprehensibility of having one creator as its sole artificer, he says:
cum igitur aut fortuna certa aut incerta natura sit, quanto venerabilius
ac melius antistitem veritatis maiorum excipere disciplinam, religiones
traditas colere . . . (6.1)
since, therefore, either fortune is certain or nature uncertain, how much
more reverent and better it is to accept the teaching of our ancestors as
the priest of truth, to cultivate the religions handed down (to us) . . .
This last point is the most relevant for our purposes, and the place where Powell thinks
Minucius has given Caecilius an inconsistent point to defend.
Indeed, the move from the skeptical position that no knowledge of divine affairs
can be had, on the one hand, to espousal of traditional Roman religion, on the other,
may seem difficult to swallow at first. In fact, Octavius himself pushes this very point at
16.1-2. But, while I think that the view Caecilius at first holds is in some sense difficult to
understand, it is important to note that it is not obviously inconsistent or a ridiculous view
to hold. It is, in fact, a somewhat common skeptical move in the history of philosophy.
When global skepticism has shown everything to be in doubt, sometimes the safest option
is thought to be to continue on in ways that are tried and true. It is a certain kind of
conservativism—different, of course, from unceasing, unflinching commitment to the
truth of tradition, rather, just that it has been tried—in that in the face of uncertain novelty
it recommends the status quo.
It seems to me that Caecilius does not hold the obviously inconsistent view that
i) the existence of the pagan gods is doubtful and ii) we should nevertheless believe that
they exist. Rather, he takes the more consistent skeptical position of arguing i) certainty
about any divine matters is unlikely to be had by a human mind (5.2-8) and ii) given
this uncertainty, we should nevertheless still practice Roman religion because of its social
22
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benefits (6.1). Indeed, notice that later Caecilius does not say that we should deis traditis
credere (as he has already expressed doubt as to whether anything certain can be known
about them), but rather prioribus credere, namely, that we ought to believe in, trust in,
our ancestors, and religiones traditas colere “cultivate the handed down religions.” Here
Caecilius means the rites, rituals, and practice of Roman religion, not anything like a
system of belief in the pagan deities.23
But it remains to say a word on what the perceived social benefits of Roman
religion are which Caecilius describes in his speech. In Caecilius’ view, and, no doubt, to
many Romans, Roman religion was essential to making Rome into the empire that it was.
He says:
sic eorum potestas et auctoritas totius orbis ambitus occupavit, sic
imperium suum ultra solis vias et ipsius oceani limites propagavit. (6.2)
thus the power and authority of those people (i.e., the Romans) has
occupied the circuit of the whole world; thus it has extended its empire
beyond the paths of the sun and the limits of the ocean itself.
Caecilius goes on to say that the religious rites of the pagan religion played no small part
in Roman military successes and the overall inculcation of Roman virtue. His point is no
matter the metaphysical truth of Roman religion—which he thinks is just as uncertain
as Christianity’s—the ritual and practice of paganism has resulted in a great many social
goods. A related point in his speech, which I will not focus on here, is that Christianity
seems less likely to produce such goods (e.g., 8.3, 12.5-7).
Again, together the two intellectual currents of Caecilius’ speech, i.e., skepticism
and traditionalism, stand in apparent tension, but not outright contradiction. Caecilius
rejects certain knowledge about gods and the cosmos, but points to the successes of the
Roman empire in the human realm and argues that Roman religion had no small part to
play in such successes.
One might, on the other hand, think that a skeptical point of view results in
disavowal of all things traditional and a refusal to assent on any matters metaphysical.
This, of course, is one possible route for the skeptic. But another, which we have been
discussing here, and which has been tried by a number of philosophers in history, is rather
to practice skepticism with respect to matters divine (divina) but accept the traditional
religion, morals, and social mores in matters civil (civilia).
This practice—of assenting to the truth of nothing in matters divine (divina)
while accepting the ‘truths’ civil (civilia) for their perceived personal, social, and political
benefit— does not just have ancient precedent. 24 It is a recurring theme in the history of
Western philosophy.25 Indeed, one is reminded of Descartes’ famous morale par provision
‘provisional morality’ in the Discourse on Method, where, in the midst of a method of
global doubt, Descartes accepts traditional Catholic moral teachings lest he cease to be
able to live in society.26 Indeed, Pascal, Kierkegaard, William James, and Wittgenstein
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have all have been termed ‘skeptical fideists’ of one stripe or another.27 Caecilius, then, is in
abundant philosophical company.
4. Conclusion
In this essay I have shown that the introduction to the Octavius, namely, in its stagesetting at Ostia and its first speech, that of Caecilius, admit of a much more charitable
interpretation than as mere props for Minucius Felix’s “Christian propaganda.” I think
that, for one, the setting of the dialogue is far from “bland,” but rather that it is charming,
inviting, and part of a venerable literary tradition in Platonic and Ciceronian dialogue
form. I call the rhetoric cultivated at the beginning of the Octavius one of impartial
philosophical debate, a continuation of the locus amoenus trope in European letters, begun
at least since Plato, but likely earlier. I then pointed the reader to further highly suggestive
imagery in the introduction to the Octavius that shows philosophical care and intention in
their composition befitting a Christian protrepticus for a pagan audience. Further, I argued
that the position defended by Caecilius in the Octavius is not inconsistent on its face, as
Powell and other interpreters have claimed, but that it is instead a form of conservative
skeptical fideism (which I called ‘urbane skeptical fideism’, tying it to the cultural milieu
of the metropolitan Late Antique Roman elite) which also has a long serious history in
Western philosophy. Taken together these point to my much more optimistic reading of
the Octavius as a genuine attempt at both literary imitation of the Ciceronian dialogue
form and intellectually responsible Christian philosophy.
In sum, when Caecilius asks that Octavius whether they might conserere
sapientiam (engage in wisdom/philosophical debate), not merely in contubernalibus
disputare (debate among friends) he was serious; and, when Octavius accepts, he delivers
on the challenge.28
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